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Consolidation of substantive democracies requires 
the establishment of measures that go far beyond 
the procedural elements of democracy, the erosion 
of which is leading to the rapid rise of illiberalism 
across the globe. It is no longer possible to asso-
ciate this phenomenon solely with the developing 
world or with those countries whose democracies 
have never truly reached the phase of consolida-
tion. We now see the erosion of liberal democracy in 
various shapes and forms across advanced democ-
racies in Europe as well as in the United States and 
beyond. Thus, we argue that the rise of illiberalism 
in advanced democracies should not be viewed as 
an isolated instance but as a natural outcome of an 
interconnected phenomenon that is rapidly gaining 
pace across the globe. As opposed to dominant ac-
counts that resort to factors stemming from identi-
ty and/or economic considerations, we believe that 
the underlying reasons behind the rise of illiberal-
ism in advanced democracies should be sought in 
multi-layered explanations that rest on the discon-
nect between globalization and democracy. 
Globalization and Hyperconnectivity: 
Potentials and Risks
It is indeed the case that global integration is rising. 
The trade volume of goods, services, and invest-
ments between countries has soared from 24 per-
cent to 39 percent of global gross domestic prod-
uct in just over a decade.1 It is the imperatives and 
outcomes of globalization that are simultaneously 
behind the prosperity as well as the risks and un-
certainties faced by advanced democracies. Rising 
levels of connectivity across the globe have fueled 
and, in turn, bolstered globalization. Connectivity 
has intensified thanks to three key interconnected 
developments that contribute to affluence but at 
the same time pose significant risks and challenges 
that need to be managed. The first concerns the 
rapid development and spread of technological 
advances since the middle of the last century. Also 
known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the 
digital breakthroughs of our globalized era have a 
transformative impact on all spheres of life. The in-
tensification of globalization is, in fact, largely due 
to the remarkable increase in digital flows in the 
last decade. While they can contribute to the ef-
ficiency of individual lives and increase global in-
come levels by promoting future economic growth 
through raising productivity and efficiency, they 
also run the risk of leading to greater levels of in-
equality, particularly through disrupting labor mar-
kets.2 There are different estimates of the extent 
to which actual jobs will be lost to automation in 
the next two to three decades, ranging from a pro-
jected 47 percent for the United States to the more 
optimistic scenario of 9 percent on average across 
OECD countries.3 The digital revolution also bears 
other types of risks such as those concerning cy-
ber and national security, as well as international 
terrorism, at a time when information and data 
flow rapidly within and across borders.
Globalization and ensuing connectivity not only 
entails fundamental technological change but also 
rapid urbanization across the world. We now see 
the rise of “global cities,” attracting the bulk of na-
tions’, as well as the world’s, economic activity and 
drawing the masses as inhabitants. A recent Brook-
ings Report on Global Cities has drawn attention to 
the fact that while 29 percent of the world popu-
lation lived in cities in 1950, more than half of the 
world’s population today live in urban areas, with 
the numbers expected to increase to 66 percent 
mid-century.4 Yet, urbanization also entails key risks 
and challenges. Particularly in the developing world, 
the large influx of people into urban centers places 
tremendous pressure on local governments’ abilities 
to provide basic services, while exacerbating prob-
lems related to climate change and public health. 
Global cities attract migrants not only from within 
the same country but also from neighboring states 
and beyond. It is estimated that by 2030, over 2.7 
billion more people will have migrated to a country 
other than their own for better work and life pros-
pects.5 This is expected to further fuel societal ten-
sions based on race, ethnicity, and nationality as well 
as deepen economic inequalities—translating into 
growing estrangement with the political system, 
heightening concerns over security, and in certain 
contexts, bolstering support for far right and popu-
list political movements that feed on such grounds. 
The third and the final element of connectivity, 
closely related to urbanization, is the expansion 
of the global middle class. There were reportedly 
3.2 billion people in the middle class by the end of 
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2016, constituting a market size of one-third of the 
global economy.6 Three billion more people, almost 
exclusively from emerging markets, are expected 
to join the ranks of these new middle classes over 
the next two decades.7 While the growth of the 
middle class may imply certain opportunities such 
as more investment in children’s education and 
contributions to global economic growth through 
consumption, it might also entail a growing disil-
lusionment on the part of these masses when it 
comes to states’ increasingly strained delivery of 
services. There is little evidence today to suggest 
that middle classes will demand more democracy 
in cases where their expectations are not met.8
The risks and challenges posed by these three con-
stituent elements of connectivity can put political 
decision makers in a difficult spot concerning the 
relationship between the type of measures that 
should be deployed in the management of these 
problems and democratic principles. In the cur-
rent global political context with heightened secu-
rity concerns, the management of these risks and 
threats, most notably in the fields of migration and 
inequality, are often sought in measures that con-
travene liberal principles in advanced democracies 
and elsewhere. While connectivity has the potential 
to lead to more prosperity, short-term foci on its 
perceived risks and the potential political costs that 
these risks may incur are paving the way for the pri-
oritization of their immediate management through 
means that in the longer run could lead to isolation 
and inward-looking policies and further distancing 
from democratic ideals. This is discernable from 
the increasing use of referendum as the main ve-
hicle deciding the fate of the political community; 
the widespread appeal of strong leaders who are 
usually above and even in conflict with their own 
political parties; and the upsurge of populism as a 
specific style of governance and ideology. 
Disconnect Between Political 
Choices and Democracy
We have entered an era of referendums across 
the globe, from the British referendum over Brexit 
and the referendum for Catalonian independence 
in Europe to the referendum for independence in 
Northern Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government and 
the referendums for regime change in Italy and 
Turkey. There seems to be a cascading influence 
of separatist referendums claiming the right to a 
new nation-state, with constant speculations about 
whether Belgium, Italy, Scotland, Ireland, or even 
Germany may be next. The fact that a vast major-
ity of these referendums are taking place in con-
solidated democracies suggests that even in cases 
where liberal democracy is taken for granted, the 
future of the political community is now decided 
less through pluralistic deliberation and represen-
tation and more through a majoritarian and polar-
izing instrument easily exploitable by the populist 
right, undermining the constituent elements of lib-
eral democracy as well as (in the case of the EU) 
dynamics of regional integration. Hence, while 
referendum may be perceived and used as a fast 
and effective way of tackling a key issue in the po-
litical community, such as claims to a new state, 
membership of a regional organization, or regime 
change for the sake of attaining security in the 
face of perceived imminent threats, the exclusion-
ary and polarizing nature of referendums runs the 
risk of undermining democracy under the banner 
of political efficacy and easily spreads beyond bor-
ders in our highly connected world.
This danger is more acute when referendums take 
place in the context of strong and often charismat-
ic leadership such as in the case of Turkey and/or in 
cases where the populist surge is present such as in 
the UK. Therefore, if this is the era of referendums, 
then it is also the era of strong leaders in place 
of declining class-based mass parties. As observed 
in the cases of Erdoğan in Turkey, Orban in Hun-
gary, or Modi in India, the leader is situated above 
the party, often at the expense of the hollowing 
or weakening of the party structure, thus leading 
to the personalization of politics and power. Even 
in established democracies such as Germany, the 
political party becomes increasingly embroiled in 
the persona of the leader. While strong leadership 
may be assumed by politicians and preferred by 
the electorates as an efficient mode of dealing with 
immediate challenges and risks especially in times 
of crisis and turmoil, it has a problematic relation-
ship with liberal democracy. As political theory and 
comparative politics have taught us, the stronger 
the leader is, the less important the political pro-
cess becomes. Key constituent elements of a liber-
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al democracy such as representation, participation, 
and deliberation, as well as checks and balances, 
can often lose their significance in the context of 
strong leadership.
Finally, and in close relationship with these two 
eras, we claim that we have also entered the era 
of populism. Populism can be defined as a style 
of governance9 and as “an ideology that consid-
ers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues 
that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
général (general will) of the people.”10 The popu-
list upsurge is already a global phenomenon in 
advanced democracies and beyond thanks to the 
success of populist parties in Europe, as well as in 
countries like Hungary, Turkey, India, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. It has emerged as part of a new broader 
global political reality that cuts across geographic, 
economic, and political boundaries. Mudde identi-
fies the three defining features of populism as an-
ti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism.11 
Populist parties and leaders claim to be anti-estab-
lishment in the sense that they represent the voice 
of the ordinary people against the “elites” of the 
establishment, be it intellectuals, big business, or 
elected mainstream politicians. They are also high-
ly authoritarian movements, which rely heavily on 
both the presence of a (often) charismatic leader 
and a preference for majoritarianism. These are not 
bottom-up movements that emerge as an end re-
sult of popular mobility: they constitute a new and 
specific mode of governance where majoritarian 
instruments such as referenda are preferred over a 
system which prioritizes checks and balances and 
the protection of minority rights. Finally, populism 
embodies nativism in the sense of favoring exclu-
sion over inclusion and closure over cosmopolitan 
values, best reflected in these movements’ anti-im-
migrant attitudes in the West and hostility towards 
ethnic and religious minorities elsewhere. 
It is widely accepted that economic challenges 
such as the global recession, increasing levels of 
unemployment, and inequality; security challenges 
such as the rise of terrorist movements; and mul-
tiple global challenges such as migration, climate 
change, and the scarcity of natural resources are 
feeding into the rise of populism across the world. 
Populist parties and leaders seem to capitalize on 
the fears of the people through the discourse of 
“managing” and “containing” these “risks.” Hence, 
they play into the sense of ontological insecurity 
across their citizens, conveying the message that 
“delivery” against these “immediate” risks trumps 
the significance of rights and freedoms.12 The in-
clusive institutional system and discourse that lies 
at the heart of modern liberal democracy is now 
being attacked by an exclusive understanding of 
political institutions, representation, identity, and 
difference. This crisis of liberal democracy is also 
both evident from and closely intertwined with the 
existential crisis that is being faced by mainstream 
political parties in their weakening membership 
base, institutional structure, and failure in deter-
mining the political agenda. Party politics as a key 
pillar of liberal democracy is increasingly losing 
its relevance for modern-day politics. In a similar 
vein, since populist leaders detest all “intermediary 
powers” between the “people” and the “leader,” in 
addition to the political party apparatuses, they 
also dismiss free and professional media as well as 
alternative voices from civil society, in turn severely 
limiting public debate over policy matters that lie 
at the core of liberal democratic politics.13 
Against this background, it is safe to conclude that 
the retreat from democracy is not a unique or a 
country-specific phenomenon but a global one in-
cluding advanced democracies. Its roots cannot 
solely be explained via economic and value-based 
considerations alone but need to be sought within 
the dynamics of globalization and connectivity as 
well as the measures that political actors, often 
with public support, utilize in the management of 
the risks and challenges that they pose. The ways 
in which specific country cases among advanced 
democracies have experienced and continue to live 
through the outlined constituent elements of glo-
balization and connectivity—and their presumed 
contribution to the rise of referendums, strong 
leaders, and populism threatening liberal democra-
cy—requires further investigation. This would help 
us in specifying the multi-layered and connected 
conditions that have given rise to illiberalism even 
in consolidated democracies, the complex mecha-
nisms behind the conditions and manifestations, as 
well as the potential solutions to salvage democ-
racy in a difficult era. 
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